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LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . LVIII
upon the authoritativeness of judicial pronouncements in other areas
where the conduct of the Administration is called into question in the
courts, but wherejudgment is rendered by reference to better defined
and more and judicially manageable standards .
J . M . EVANS *
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DEFENCE OF ENTRAPMENT-DISCRE-
TION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE.-The enforcement of the criminal law
is entrusted to the criminal courts and to the police . In seeking to
fulfill this undertaking both have distinct, yet complementary roles
to play . However, there are occasions when the courts are called
upon to investigate certain activities of the police which appear to
transgress the very laws that they are entrusted to enforce . In
resolving this dilemma, the courts have attempted to strike a delicate
balance between the right of society to be protected from criminal
activity and the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
and intrusive police behaviour . In other words, while furthering the
ends of social justice by facilitating the truth-seeking process, the
courts must ensure that an individual accused receives a fair trial .
Canadian courts, like all other courts, have found such a task to be
extremely troublesome . In particular, the courts have wrestled with
the problems of a defence of entrapment, the doctrine of abuse of
process and the discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence . In
the recent decision of Regina v . Sang, 1 the House of Lords and the
Court of Appeal addressed all of these problems and handed down
opinions which are of considerable interest to the Canadian lawyer .
Furthermore, the House offers some interesting insights into the
general philosophy underlying the Anglo-Canadian law of evidence .
The appellant, Sang, was indicted on two counts of conspiracy
with others to utter counterfeit United States banknotes, knowing
them to be forged and with intent to defraud, and of unlawful
possession of such forged banknotes . 2 After arraignment, but before
the Crown had opened its case, counsel for Sang requested that a voir
dire be held . He asserted that, if his claims were successful, the trial
judge would be obliged to rule that the Crown could adduce no
evidence against the accused and that the jury would have to be
directed to enter a verdict of not guilty . The court was told that,
* J . M . Evans, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto .
1 [197912 All E.R . 1222 (H.L .), [1979] 2 All E.R . 46 (C.A .) .
z The facts are taken substantially from the judgment of Lord Salmon, ibid ., at
p . 1235 .
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while the accused had been in prison, he had been approached by a
fellow prisoner who, unbeknown to the accused, was alleged to be a
police informer and an agent provocateur . It was alleged3 that this
prisoner told Sang that he knew of a safe buyer of forged banknotes
and that he would arrange for this buyer to contact Sang after his
release . A meeting was arranged where a deal was to be completed
for the purchase of the banknotes . The rendezvous was kept but it
turned out to be a police trap . The forged currency was confiscated
and the accused and his comrades were arrested .
Counsel claimed that these facts, if proved, would establish that
the accused had been induced by an agent provocateur to commit a
crime which, but for the inducement, he would never have
committed and that the law required the judge to disallow any
evidence of the accused's guilt to be called by the Crown.
Alternatively, he argued that the trial judge had a discretion to reject
any evidence of the offence because it had been unfairly obtained
and he was bound by authority to exercise that discretion in the
accused's favour . The trial judge, His Honour Judge Buzzard,
expressed doubts as to whether he possessed such a discretion and
listened to argument as to its existence in point of law . 4 The result
was a ruling that he did not possess a discretion to exclude the
prosecution's evidence. Sang then altered his plea to one of guilty
and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment . He appealed
from this decision . 5
The Defence of Entrapment
Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords decided
unanimously and unequivocally that the defence of entrapment has
no place in English law. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate
courts did not break new ground, but simply confirmed a line of
recent decisions .' However, a,majority of the House of Lords did
concede that evidence of entrapment might be of considerable
s The House of Lords was careful to point out that the voir dire was never held
and that no evidence of improper conduct was called to support the allegations. See
the observations of Lord Diplock, ibid ., at p, 1225 and of Lord Salmon, at p. 1236 .
a Argument proceeded on the assumption, agreed to by both counsel, that the
necessary facts had been established (i .e ., that Sang's offences would not have been
committed but for police incitement through an informer to commit them). For
comments as to this course of action, having regard to "the exceptional
circumstances of this case", see Roskill L.J ., ibid ., at p. 49 .
s Mangan, an associate, received a suspended sentence at trial and had lost touch
with his solicitors by the time the appeal was heard . He was not represented on the,
hearing of Sang's appeal .
s See Regina v . McEvilly, Regina v. Lee (1973), 60 Cr . App . R. 150; Regina v.
Mealey, Regina v . Sheridan (1973), 60 Cr . App. R. 59 .
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significance in mitigation of the punishment for the offence . 7 The
reasoning of the House in support of this stance is succinctly
articulated by Lord Diplock :$
Many crimes are committed by one person at the instigation of others . From
earliest times at common law those who counsel and procure the commission of
the offence by the person by whom the actus reus itself is done have been guilty
themselves of an offence, and since the abolition by the Criminal Law Act 1967
of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours can be tried, indicted
and punished as principal offenders . The fact that the counsellor and procurer is
a policeman or a police informer, although it may be of relevance in mitigation
ofpenalty for the offence, cannot affect the guilt ofthe principal offender; both
the physical element (actus reus) and the mental element (mens rea) of the
offence with which he is charged are present in his case .
In Canada, a lively debate, both inside and outside the courts, is
still conducted as to the possible existence and character of a defence'
of entrapment . 9 In the recent case of Kirzner v . The Queen, "
although a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada declined to
address the issue," Laskin C.J .C., in a judgment concurred in by
Spence, Dickson and Beetz JJ ., 12 disapproved of judicial rejections
of the existence of such a defence, 13 but refused to lay down any
guidelines for the introduction and application of a defence of
entrapment . However, he did provide a useful review of the
solutions adopted by other Commonwealth countries and by the
United States ." In the United States . a substantive defence of
entrapment does exist, but is limited to those situations "when the
Government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the
mind of the defendant" and not when "the Government merely
afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the of-
fense' .15 A similar solution has also been adopted in a modified
' See supra, footnote 1, at p . 1226, per Lord Diplock, at p . 1236, per Lord
Salmon, at p . 1238, per Lord Fraser, and at p . 1243, per Lord Scarman .
$ Ibid ., at p . 1226, per Lord Diplock .
s See Shafer and Sheridan, The Defence of Entrapment (1970), 8 Osgoode
H.L .J . 277 ; Watt, The Defence of Entrapment (1971), 13 Cr . L.Q . 313 ; Sneidman,
A Judicial Test for Entrapment : The Glimmerings of a Canadian Policy of
Police-Instigated Crime (1973), 16 Cr. L .Q . 81 ; and Paterson, Towards A Defence
of Entrapment (1979), 17 Osgoode H.L .J . 261 .
to [197812 S .C.R . 487 . See also Lemieux v . The Queen, [1967] S.C.R . 492 ;
Regina v . Ormerod, [19691 2 O.R . 230 (C.A .) ; and Regina v . Bonnar (1975), 34
C.R.N.S . 187 (N.S . App . Div .) .
11 Mr . Justice Pigeon delivered a very brief judgment on behalf of Martland,
Ritchie, Beetz and Pratte JJ. ; ibid ., at p . 503 .
12 Ibid ., at p . 489 .
's SeeRegina v . Chernecki (l971), 16 C.R.N.S . 230 (B .C.C.A .) andRegina v .
Kirzner (1977), 14 O.R . (2d) 665 (C.A .) .
l' Supra, footnote 10, at pp. 494-498 .
's United States v . Russell (1973), 411 U.S . 423, at p . 435, per Rehnquist J . For
a survey of the development of American law since Sorrells v . United States (1932),
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form by the Supreme Court of New Zealand." Nevertheless, the
English courts were unable to accept this distinction and held that
such a doctrine would be tantamount "to giving the judge the power
of changing or disregarding the law . . . [and] would be seriously
detrimental to public safety and to law and order" ." Also, as Lord
Fraser opines, such arguments cannot be logically supported: 18
The assertion by an accused person that he has been induced by some other
person to commit a crime necessarily involves admitting that he has in fact
committed the crime. Ex hypothesi he must have done the necessary act and
have done it intentionally, in response to the inducement . All the elements,
factual and mental, of guilt are thus present and no finding other than guilty
would logically be possible .
In his wide-ranging judgment in Kirzner, Laskin C.J.C . had
occasion to summarise the English approach to the question of a
defence of entrapment and stated that "in England, judicial
revulsion against entrapment of an accused has been manifested not
through the recognition of a defence on that ground, but rather
through a discretionary control of the admissibility of evidence"."
Although he favoured such an approach, he recognized that the road
to Canada adopting that solution had been cut off by the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Wray2° which decided
that no such residual discretion existed. The Supreme Court
interpreted and relied upon a line of English authorities in arriving at
its conclusions. 21 However, the decision of the House of Lords in
Sang shows not only that that description of English law was
inaccurate 22 but also demonstrates - that a solution of that nature
would be unsound both in logic and in practice . To adopt such a
solution would be equal to letting in at the back door that which has
287 U.S . 435, see Park, The Entrapment Controversy (1975-76), 60 Minn . L. Rev.
163.
11 See Regina v. Capner, [1975] 1 N. Z .L.R . 411 andRegina v. Pethig, [1977]
1 N .Z.L.R . 448. The Supreme Court held that a judge had a discretion to exclude
evidence if the police actually encouraged or stimulated offences that otherwise
would not be committed . For an examination ofthe law leading up to these decisions,
see Barlow, Recent Developments in New Zealand in the Law relating to
Entrapment, [1976] N.Z.L .J . 304.
i~ Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1236, per Lord Salmon .
is Ibid ., at p. 1238 .
is Supra, footnote 10, at pp . 494-495.
20 [19711 S .C.R . 273.
21 See infra, text accompanying footnotes 29-31 .
22 Laskin, C.J .C . is not alone in reaching this conclusion . Paterson contends
that the English courts hold an untrammelled discretion to exclude evidence obtained
by oppressiveness "and have a considerable margin of flexibility within which to
operate and to achieve a significant degree of control over police malpractice" ; op .
cii., footnote 9, at p . 267 . Also, J.D . Heydon advocates the use of such a discretion
in English law and suggests that it should be exercised after certain considerations
have been taken into account: The Problem of Entrapment, [1973] Camb.L .J . 268.
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been kept out at the front door ;23 "it is the law that there is no
defence of entrapment . . . [and] the judge may not by the exercise
of his discretion to exclude admissible evidence secure to the
accused the benefit of a defence unknown to the law" . 24 Moreoever,
the House of Lords did not confine its remarks on exclusionary
discretion to the defence of entrapment alone, but seized the
opportunity to examine the much wider question of the scope and
exercise of a criminal judge's discretion to exclude technically
admissible evidence .
The Discretion to Exclude Evidence
It will be remembered that, in Wray,25 the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded by a majority, that there exists no residual
discretion to exclude admissible evidence because its admission
might bring the administration ofjustice into disrepute or be unfair to
the accused .26 The majority drew a sharp and important distinction
between unfairness in the method of obtaining evidence and in the
use to which it is put at trial .27 The paramount duty of the trial judge
is to secure a fair trial for the accused and, to this end, all relevant
and logically probative evidence, regardless of how it was obtained,
must be admitted unless its admission would jeopardize the
likelihood of a fair trial . As Mr. Justice Martland noted : 28
The exercise of a discretion by the trial judge arises only if the admission of the
evidence would operate unfairly . The allowance of admissible evidence
relevant to the issue before the court and of substantive probative value may
operate unfortunately for the accused, but not unfairly . It is only the allowance
of evidence gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which is
tenuous and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the court
is trifling which can be said to operate unfairly .
In arriving at this decision, the court placed a restrictive interpreta-
tion on the English authorities of Noor Mohamed v . The King,"
23 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 61, per Roskill L . J .
2' Ibid ., at p . 1245, per Lord Scarman ; see also the observations of Lord
Diplock, at p . 1227 and Lord Fraser, at p . 1238 .
25 Supra, footnote 20 .
SB The court also held following Rex v . St . Lawrence (1949), 93 C.C.C . 376,
[19491 O .R . 215, that that part of inadmissible evidence confirmed by the discovery
of subsequent facts is admissible .
21 The majority consisted of Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon, Abbott, Fauteux and
Judson JJ . A strong dissent was delivered by Cartwright C.J . and Hall and Spence JJ .
who tended to blur the distinction between the right to a fair trial and fairness in
obtaining of evidence .
28 Supra, footnote 20, at p . 239 .
29 [19491 A .C . 182, [19491 1 All E.R . 365 .
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Kuruma Son of Kaniu v . The Queen 30 and Callis v . Gunn3t and
doubted the wisdom of extending such an uncertain and unstructured
concept as the judicial discretion to exclude evidence .3 2
Although this decision has been consistently followed by
Canadian courts ,33 it was given a cold reception by many lawyers . 34
Apart from claiming that the precedential foundation of the decision
was unsound and unjustifiable, the major thrust of the critics'
arguments was that, by taking such a stance, the court had shown
scant regard for individual rights and had provided no disincentive to
the police to refrain from objectionable tactics and practices in the
obtaining of evidence . 35 Indeed, much of the lingering dissatisfac-
30 [1955] A.C . 197, [1965] 1 All E .R . 236.
31 [19641 1 Q.B . 495 (C .A .), [196313 All E.R . 677.
32 As Mt . Justice Judson observed, "Judicial discretion . . . is a concept which
involves great uncertainty of application . The task of ajudge in the conduct of a trial
is to apply the law and to admit all evidence that is logically probative unless it is
ruled out by some exclusionary rule"; supra, footnote 20, at p . 300.
33 See, for instance, Cronkwright v . Cronkwright, [197013 O.R . 784; Regina v.
Glynn (1971), 15 C.R.N .S . 343; Regina v . Deleo (1972), 18 C.R.N .S . 261;Laporte
v . Laporte (1972), 18 C.R .N.S . 357; Regina v . Darwin (1974), 13 C.C.C . (2d) 432;
Regina v . Thompson (1974), 26 C.R.N .S . 153; Regina v . Tretter (1974), 26
C.R.N .S . 144; Regina v . Moore (1974), 17 C.C.C . (2d) 348; Regina v . Paquette
(1976), 27 C.C.C . (2d) 145; Regina v . Turner (1977), 19 N.S .R. (2d) 82; Regina v .
Powell (1978), 37 C.C.C . (2d) 117; Regina v . Dingham (1978), 4 C.R . (3d) 193;
Regina v . Gill, [1979] 1 W.W.R . 475; Regina v. Andrews (1979), 8 C.R . (3d) 1 ; and
Regina v . Letendre (1979), 7 C.R . (3d) 320. It has been held, however, that Wray
does not extend to collateral issues such as credibility and should be restricted to
substantive issues : Regina v . Hawke (1974), 3 O.R . (2d) 210.
a' For a survey of the allegedly disagreeable implications, see A.F . Sheppard,
Restricting the Discretion to Exclude Admissible Evidence ; An Examination of
Regina v . Wray (1972), 14 Crim . L.Q . 334.
The case also elicited a response from the Federal and Ontario Law Reform
Commissions . The Ontario Law Reform Commission's, Reform on The Law of
Evidence (1976), p. 94, recommended that the Evidence Act of Ontario, R.S .O .,
1970, c. 151, be amended to include a provision that "In a proceeding the court may
refuse to admit evidence that otherwise would be admissible if the court finds that it
was obtained by methods that are repugnant to the fair administration of justice and
likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute." The FederalLaw Reform
Commission's, Report on Evidence (1975) contains a draft Act and s. 15 provides
that "Evidence shall be excluded if it was obtained under such circumstances that its
use in the proceedings would tend to bring the administration of justice into
disrepute" ; sub-section (2) provides that : "In determining whether evidence should
be excluded under this section, all the circumstances surrounding the proceedings
and the manner in which the evidence was obtained shall be considered, including the
extent to which human dignity and social values were breached in obtaining the
evidence, the seriousness of the case, the importance of the evidence, whether any
harm to an accused or others was inflicted wilfully or not, and whether there were
circumstances justifying the action, such as a situation or urgency requiring the
action to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence" .
3s An example of the strength of feeling that the decision has engendered is
reflected in the words of Clayton C. Ruby : "The most significant event in Canadian
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tion with the decision can be traced back to the derivative and
sweeping nature of the court's argument and to the failure of the
court to address itself to and articulate fully the major premises and
principles upon which it based its decision . However, in what can be
seen as support for the Supreme Court of Canada and a reply to its
critics, the judgments of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal
in Sang provide ample support for the actual decision and general
line of reasoning adopted by the majority in Wray .
In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Roskill L .J .,
delivering the judgment of the court, undertook a thorough and
informative review of the authorities 36 and rejected the argument that
the trial judge possessed a discretion to exclude probative evidence
on the particular facts . The court, therefore, reaffirmed the status of
Kuruma Son of Kaniu v . R . ,37 that evidence which is relevant to the
issue before the court is admissible, regardless of how that evidence
has been obtained . It stated that this rule was to be qualified only in
cases where the evidence was of little probative value but of highly
prejudicial effect" and, in the case of confessions, improperly
obtained . Roskill L .J . argued that the courts have always had power
to exclude such evidence since "it is always the duty of the Court to
law in the last 10 years was the case of Regina v . Wray in 1970, in which it was
brought out that the judge has little or no discretion to exclude from a trial
illegally-obtained Crown evidence . This meant that in a trial, a piece ofevidence can
be used no matter how it was obtained . In other words, it sanctions police
lawlessness in order to obtain evidence . The significance of this event is that it
encourages police to commit crimes in the course of gathering evidence against a
suspect, and has embedded in our legal theory the dangerous idea that the end
justifies the means." : Canadian Lawyer (December 1979), at p . 29 .
16 Roskill L.J . traced the development ofthe law from the observations of Lords
Moulton and Reading, respectively, in R . v . Christie, [1914] A .C . 545, at pp . 559
and 564-565, [1914-15] All E .R . 63, at pp . 69 and 71 ; to the statements of Lord Du
I'arcq in Noor Mohamed v . The King, supra, footnote 29, at pp . 192 (A.C .), 370
(All E.R .), and of Viscount Simon inHarris v . D.P .P ., [1952] A.C . 694, at p . 707,
[1952] I All E.R . 1044, at p . 1048 ; and of their treatment by Lord Goddard C.J . in
Kuruma Son ofKaniu v . The Queen, supra, footnote 30, at pp . 204, (A . C .), 239 (All
E.R .) . Other cases discussed are Brannon v . Peek, [1948] I K .B . 68, [194712 All
E .R . 572 ; R . v, Payne, [1963] 1 All E.R . 848, [19631 1 W.L.R . 637 ;R . v . Murphy,
[1965] N.I . 138 ; Callis v . Gunn, supra, footnote 31 ; as well as a series of recent
cases in the area, notably, R . v . Birtles, [1969] 2 All E.R . 1131 ; R . v . McCann
(1972), 56 Cr . App . R . 359:R . v . McEvilly (1973), 60 Cr. App . R . 150;R . v . Mealey
(1974), 60 Cr . App . R . 59;R . v . Willis, [1976] Crim . L.R . 127 ; andJeffrey v . Black,
[1978] Q .B . 490, [19781 1 All E.R . 555 .
37 Ibid ., see the remarks of Roskill L.J ., supra, footnote 1, at pp . 50 and 62 .
3 $ It is unclear whether Roskill L.J . would apply this equation to any evidence
called or only to evidence of so-called "similar facts" . His concluding remarks,
supra, footnote 1, at p . 62, would seem to suggest the latter stance ; but compare his
views expressed, ibid ., at p . 53, which can be read as envisaging a wider scope for
this discretion to exclude .
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safeguard an accused person against the risks of wrongful conviction
in consequence of the admission of evidence of that kind" . 39 The
existence of any wider discretion was denied,, although the court did
observe that "if . . . there is a residual discretion of the kind
contended for, it can . . . .only be where the . actions of the
prosecution amount to an abuse of the process of the court and are
oppressive in that sense" .40
Leave to appeal from this decision was granted by the House of
Lords as a point of law of general public importance was involved in
the decision ; namely, whether a trial judge41 had a discretion to
refuse to allow evidence, being evidence other than .evidence of
admission, to be given in any circumstances in which such evidence
is . relevant and of more than minimal probative value . Their
Lordships were unanimous in dismissing the appeal and, although
five separate opinions were delivered, all agreed with the answer to
the stated question given by Lord Diplock:42
(1) A trial judge in a criminal trial has always a discretion to refuse to admit
evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
value .
(2) Save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally with regard
to evidence obtained from the accused after the commission of the offence,
sa Ibid ., at p. 62 .
ao Ibid ., at p. 63 . The essence ofthe doctrine of abuse process is that it provides
a device through which the courts can ensure that the use to which proceedings are
put and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are controlled ; "the jurisdiction
which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to fulfill itself as,a
court of law" : see Jacobs, The Inherent Jurisdiction ofthe Court (1970), 23 Curr . L.
Prob . 23 .
The continued existence and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the criminal
courts to prevent an abuse of process has been severely challenged by the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Osborn, [1971) S.C .R . 184
andRourke v. The Queen, [197811 S .C.R . 1021 . However, the preferred view seems
to be that, as a result of the uncertainty and division of opinion expressed in those
cases, the doctrine of abuse of process still exists, but is only applicable in
exceptional circumstances; see Cohen, Abuse of Process: The Aftermath ofRourke
(1977), 39 C.R.N .S . 349 and Olah, The Doctrine of Abuse of Process : Alive and
Well in Canada (1978), 1 C.R . (3d) 341 . However, it would seem that those
exceptional circumstances would be "so rare as to be predictably more theoretical
than practical" ; see Jacobs, Comments (1978), 12 U.B .C.L. Rev. 127 .
" Their Lordships took the view that their comments upon the existence of the
discretion were not confined to trials by jury and that thediscretion, whatever be its
limits, extended to whoever presides in a judicial capacity over a criminal trial,
whether it be held in the Crown Court or in a Magistrates Court. See, for example,
Lord Diplock, supra, footnote 1, at p. 1225 ; Viscount Dilhorne, at p. 1234 ; Lord
Fraser, at p . 1242 ; and Lord Scarman, at .pp. 1246-1247.
1 Ibid ., at p. 1231 . This was the answer agreed to by Viscount Dilhorne, at
p. 1235 ; Lord Fraser, at p. 1242 ; and Lord Scarman, at p. 1247 . Lord Salmon, at
p. 1237, offered his conclusions in different terms but said that he understood
Lord Diplock's proposition to accept that which he had stated and expressed his
agreement, on that basis .
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he has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the
ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means.
The primary interest in the case, therefore, stems from the
differing approaches taken to the scope of the discretion to exclude
relevant and technically admissible evidence, rather than the
existence of such a discretion which all of their Lordships
accepted . 43 Lord Diplock was of the clear opinion that there was a
general rule of practice whereby a trial judge has the discretion to
exclude relevant evidence when its prejudicial influence was out of
proportion to its true evidential value . 44 However, he saw the
difficult question to be the extent of such a discretion . For Lord
Diplock, the source of the arguments for a wider discretion can be
traced to a misinterpretation of the celebrated dictum of Lord
Goddard in Kuruma 45 : "No doubt in a criminal case the judge always
has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of
admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused . . . If, for
instance, some admission of some piece of evidence, e.g ., a
document, had been obtained from a defendant by a trick, no doubt
the judge might properly rule it out . "46 Lord Diplock rationalises
this dictum with his own conclusions by arguing that the situation
envisaged by Lord Goddard would clearly fall within the second limb
of his statement of the law and would be treated in the same manner
as an unfairly induced confession .47 Also, His Lordship endeavoured
to explain Regina v. Payne48 on the same ground, the only case
relied upon by Sang's counsel in which evidence was actually
excluded because it had been obtained unfairly . Accordingly, the
core of the opinion is that the court should not be concerned, except
in the case of admissions, with how evidence was obtained but with
4s See the observations of Lord Diplock, ibid ., at p. 1228 ; Viscount Dilhorne, at
pp . 1231-1232; Lord Salmon at p. 1237 ; Lord Fraser, at pp . 1238-1239; and Lord
Scarman at p. 1243 .
44 Ibid ., at p. 1228,
4s Supra, footnote 30 .
4s Ibid .,at p. 204 (A.C .) .
47 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1229 . Reference was made in this context to R. v.
Barker, [1941] 2 K.B . 381, [194113 All E.R . 33, where an incriminating document
was obtained from a defendant by a promise of favours and was held to be
inadmissible . In his opinion, Viscount Dilhorne also referred to this case in similar
vein : see ibid ., at p. 1233 . As Cross points out in Cross on Evidence (5th ed ., 1979),
in the Addendum, p. ix, Barker was a decision which had been thought to turn on
admissibility as a matter of law. Viscount Dilhorne was, however, more critical in
his observations on Lord Goddard's dictum, stating that this was "not an instance of
evidence which a judge can exclude on account of its prejudicial effect as compared
with its probative value and is not easily reconcilable with his statement that the court
is not concerned with how evidence was obtained", ibid .
48 [19631 1 All E.R . 848, [19631 1 W.L.R . 637.
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the use to which the prosecutionmay put such evidence at trial . In so
holding, Lord Diplock was anxious to avoid "a claim to a judicial
discretion to acquit an accused of any offences in connection with
which the conduct of the police incurs the disapproval of the
judge" ."
Viscount Dilhorne took a similar approach to Lord Diplock
asserting that, in his view, the trial judge has the ability to "disallow
the use in any trial of admissible relevant evidence if : . . its 'use
would be accompanied by effects prejudicial to the accusedwhich
would outweigh its probative value" .5° Despite a minor disagree-
ment on the function of the judicial .process,st both Lord Salmon and
Lord Scarman were united in the view that the trial judge possesses
"a discretion to exclude legally admissible evidence if justice so
requires' 1 .51 Lord Fraser was of a similar opinion. . He stated
categorically that "the discretion is not limited to excluding
evidence which is likely to have prejudicial effects out of proportion
to its evidential value' 1,53 arguing that "the dicta are so numerous
and so authoritative that I do not think it would be right to disregard
them' 154 or to limit them in the way suggested by Lord Diplock and
Viscount Dilhorne . Also, he did not share the apprehensions of Lord
Diplock and RoRoskillLJ. 11 about the repercussions of allowing
such a wide discretion . He stàted :5s
The result will be to leave judges with a discretion to be exercised in
accordance with their individual views of what is unfair or oppressive or
morally reprehensible.' . . . But I do not think there is any cause for anxiety in
that . Judges ofall Courts are accustomed to deciding what is reasonable and to
applying other standards containing a large subjective element . . . . I do not
think it would be practicable to attempt to lay down any more precise rules
because the purpose of the discretion is that it should be sufficiently wide and
's Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1227 . Roskill L.J ., ibid ., at p. 62, shared-similar
sentiments: "subjective views of what is morally permissible or reprehensible are an
unsafe guide to the administration of the criminal law and to the proper exercise of
judicial discretion" . But compare the views expressed by Lord Fraser, infra, text
accompanying footnote 56 .
ss Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 1231-1232.
s' Lord Salmon, ibid ., at p. 1237, was of_ the opinion that "the decision whether
evidence may be excluded depends entirely on the particular facts of each case and
the circumstances surrounding it, which are infinitely variable"; whereas Lord
Scàrman expressed the view, ibid ., at p. 1244, that "one must . . . emerge from that
last refuge of legal thought, that each case depends on its facts, and attempt some
analysis of principle" .
sz Ibid ., at pp . 1237 and 1243, following Lord Reid inMyers v. D.P.P ., [1965]
A.C . 1001, at p. 1024, [196412 All E.R . 881, at p. 887.
"Ibid., at p . 1239. .
"Ibid., at p . 1241 .
ss Supra, footnote 49 .
ss Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 1241-1242.
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flexible to be capable of being exercised in a variety of circumstances that may
occur from time to time but which cannot be foreseen .
The lack of consensus apparent in the opinions is puzzling,
especially considering that all their Lordships agreed with the answer
to the stated question formulated by Lord Diplock.s' Moreover, the
central and common theme of each opinion was the duty of the judge
to secure a fair trial for the accused ." Also, there was substantial
agreement on how such a duty should be fulfilled in considering the
conduct of the police :
The role of thejudge is confined to the forensic process. He controls neitherthe
police nor the prosecuting authority, He neither initiates nor stifles a
prosecution . . . . The judge is concerned only with the conduct of the trial."
However, although all of their Lordships posit the existence and
scope of the discretion upon the notion of fairness at trial, there is a
major difference of opinion over the ideal of "fairness" and the way
in which such a concept is to be articulated within the abstract
confines of a discretion to exclude legally relevant evidence .
Opinions differed as to what would constitute the unfair use of
evidence at the trial and their Lordships' conclusions stemmed from
their views on the freedom of the trial judge to determine this for
himself . For example, Lord Fraser made it clear that, in his view, an
integral part of the judicial function is the making of subjective value
judgments by the trial judge on what is, and what is not, morally
permissible or reprehensible .s° Lord Diplock, on the other hand,
found himself less able to tolerate a system in which the judge is
endowed with an untrammelled freedom to make such decisions .s t
As a result, Lord Fraser, along with Lords Salmon and Scarman, was
prepared to subscribe to a discretion, the scope of which was to be
related to the requirements of justice in the particular case . Lord
Diplock and Viscount Dilhorne, however, took a more cautious
stance, reflected in their restriction of the width of the discretion to
the situation where the prejudicial effect of adducing the evidence
would exceed its probative value . This solution has the merit of
presenting the trial judge with, at least, minimally defined legal
guidelines on which to base his decision to exclude or not and one
which would be susceptible to appellate review .
57 Supra, text accompanying footnote 42 .
58 See e.g ., the observations of Lord Diplock supra, footnote 1, at p. 1230 ;
Viscount Dilhorne, at p. 1232 ; Lord Salmon, at p. 1237 ; Lord Fraser, at p. 1239 ; and
Lord Scarman, at p. 1244 .
11 Ibid ., per Lord Scarman, at p. 1245 . See also the observations of Viscount
Dilhorne, at p. 1232 .
60 See text accompanying footnotes 49 and 56, supra .
s i Ibid .
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It is submitted that the House of Lords was committed to admit
the existence of, at least, a partial exclusionary discretion as a direct
result of the Kuruma doctrine . Any scheme of admissibility which
permits all relevant evidence, however obtained, to be adduced
without any reference to the fairness of calling such evidence will
provoke important responses . The judiciary would fear a lack of
control over the conduct of the trial, if the prosecution were free to
call any relevant evidence it desired . It would seriously handicap the
trial judge's ability to maintain an impartial balance between
prosecution and defence at a criminal trial . Also, those who fear for
individual liberty would resent such a blatant intrusion upon the
fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial, and would view it as
yet another weapon being placed at the disposal of an already
well-stocked prosecutor's armoury . However, the sanctioning of a
wide exclusionary discretion is not without its drawbacks and would
have potentially strong repercussions for the legal system .
Apart from the obvious danger of the capricious exercise of
such discretion, with the likelihood of subverting existing rules of
law 62 there is also the possibility that there would occur an ultimate
shift in the regime adopted to control the admissibility of evidence,
in general, and illegally obtained evidence, in particular . It is but a
short step from admitting the existence of a wide exclusionary
discretion based on fairness to a scenario in which the admissibility
of evidence depends not upon the Kuruma test but upon a subjective
judicial assessment of fairness . As Cross notes, the Anglo-Canadian
law of evidence "still consists to a large extent of exclusionary rules
. . . declaring , in other words, what is not judicial evidence" . 63 The
premise for such a conclusion is that, prima facie, all relevant
evidence is admissible . Accordingly, a wide exclusionary discretion
would remove questions of admissibility from the relative certainty
of established substantive rules arid expose them to an ill-defined
judicial discretion . Such a drastic upheaval can surely only be
reached by conscious reflection, undertaken in a sound and
principled fashion, and cannot be allowed to slip inadvertently into
the basis of the law of evidence as a by-product of discretion .
Furthermore, it can be argued that the protection of individual rights
sa See, forexample, the instant case, in which the use of such a discretion would
have permitted the defence of entrapment to be re-introduced by the "back door",
supra, footnote 23 . There is also evidence of judicial reluctance to exercise such a
discretion . As Roskill L.J . noted, supra, footnote 1, at p. 63, Payne was the only
case in which a discretion was exercised to exclude evidence of this kind and one
would have thought that, were such a discretion to exist, it would have been invoked
to exclude the evidence in cases such as Kuruma and Jeffrey v. Black, supra,
footnote 36 .
11 Supra, footnote 47, at p . 1 .
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is much better served by a well-ordered legal system than being left
to the unsafe and uncertain dictates ofjudicial discretion . It is by no
means certain that all judges would adopt principles acceptable to the
guardians of individual liberty and could not be guaranteed to
exercise that discretion for the benefit of those most in need of its
assistance .
In arriving at its decision, the House of Lords will be seen by
many as having compounded the injustice of Wray . By turning a
blind eye to the manner in which evidence is obtained, the courts will
be charged with aiding and abetting police misconduct ; their role as
bulwarks against oppression and as defenders of civil liberties will
be severely compromised . However, on closer examination, the
stance taken is not so indefensible and is revealed as being based on
logical argument and sound experience . At the heart of the decision
lies the belief that the rules of evidence are an inappropriate and
ineffective means by which to control police behaviour." This belief
can be supported by two convincing arguments . Following the
American Supreme Court's introduction of a rigorous regime of
procedural safeguards, based on the constitutional requirements of
due process, to protect arrested suspects and to curb police
misbehaviour,s5 a series of empirical studies revealed that the new
regime had no significant impact on police practice and, in certain
instances, actually encouraged police perjury .66 Indeed, the exis-
tence of a wide exclusionary discretion would have the effect of
deflecting the truth-finding process and allowing guilty persons to go
free . It is strange logic that in seeking to support and dispense
justice, attention is focused not on bringing to account the policeman
11 For a thorough canvassing of all the issues and arguments in this debate, see
Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence (1978), 5 Judicature
214 .
ss It is a judge-made rule and originated in Weeks v . United States (1914), 232
U.S . 384 . Although the rule is not required by the American Constitution, it has been
developed by invoking the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments (the right
against self-incrimination; the right to counsel ; and the necessity for due process of
law) . Its modern formulation stems from Mapp v . Ohio (1961), 367 U.S . 643, and its
full significance was declared in Miranda v . Arizona (1966), 384 U.S . 436 . This
strengthening of the doctrine came as a result of a strong liberal lobby to curb police
activities . However, some observers felt that the Supreme Court went much too far
and that the new regime would unnecessarily hamper the police in their legitimate
role and would favour the criminal unduly ; see Elsen and Rosett, Protections for the
Suspect under Miranda v . Arizona (1967), 67 Col . L . Rev . 645 .
ss See Special Project, Interrogation in New Haven : The Impact of Miranda
(1967), 76 Yale L.J . 1519 ; See Burger and Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh - A
Statistical Study (1967), 29 U . Pitts . L . Rev . 1 ; Medasie, Zeitz and Alexander,
Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital : The Attempt to Implement
Miranda (1968), 66 Mich . L . Rev . 1347 ; and Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure (1970), 37 U . Chi . L . Rev . 655 .
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who acted improperly, but on setting free a person who committed
some criminal act; "the criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered" ." In short, the rationale for an exclusionary
discretion is built on the spurious contention that two wrongs make a
right. The control of the police must result in the protection of
society and not the release of criminals .
The corollary of such arguments is not that the courts are
disinterested in or condone police malpractice, but that other
methods will have to be utilized to monitor police activity . It is a
pragmatic conclusion based on the most efficient and effective
allocation of legal resources. The available alternatives are increased
police disciplinary action, improved police training" and responsive
tortious remedies .s 9 Although the present efficacy of these alterna-
tives is questionable, the problem lies not so much in their suitability
but in their application and performance. Each alternative strikes
directly at the alleged misconduct and can be pursued independently
from the criminal prosecution of the victim. Indeed, the existence of
an exclusionary discretion undercuts' and inhibits the development
and increased efficiency of such alternatives . -
An issue touched upon tangentially by their Lordships was the
question of the exclusion of legally admissible confessions._ Their
comments were necessarily obiter, but some interesting points were
raised . Lord Diplock discusses the role of the trial judge in relation
to confessions and "evidence obtained from the defendant after the
commission of the offence that is tantamount to a confession" .76
Confessions are, once more, treated as a special type of evidence,
enabling the judge to control improper prosecution activities entered
into before the commencement of the proceedings . However, the
only reasons offered for this special treatment are said to be
historical' 1 and no real investigation into the special status of this
type of evidence is put forward.- His Lordship also delivers the
clearest exposition by an English judge of the rationale for the
87 People v. De Fore (1926), 242N.Y . 13, at pp . 23-24, per Cardozo J.
88 For an overview and appraisal of the problem of controlling the police by
internal disciplinary procedures and more responsible training, see Grant, The
Police: Organization, Personnel and Problems, inThe Practice of Freedom, edited by
MacDonald and Humphrey (1979), p. 405 and The Control of Police Behaviour, in
Some Civil Liberty Issues of The Seventies, edited by Tarnopolsky (1974), p. 75 .
69 For an analysis and evaluation of the available tortious remedies, see Weiler,
The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Tort Lawyer, in Studies in
Canadian Tort Law; edited by Linden (1969), p., 416 and Spiotto, The Search and
Seizure Problem - Two Approaches : The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S .
Exclusionary Rules (1973), 1 J. of Pol. Sci. and Ad . 36 .
"Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1230 .
" Ibid .
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exclusion of confessions, stating that: "the underlying rationale of
this branch of the criminal law, though it may have been based on
ensuring the reliability of confessions is, in my view, now to be
found in the maxim, Nemo debet prodere se ipsum, no one can be
required to be his own betrayer, or in its popular English
mistranslation `the right to silence' ."'2 The move, therefore, is away
from trustworthiness as the sole rationale for the doctrine but it
remains to be seen what effect this will have on the Wray doctrine in
Canada .73
The importance of the Sang case lies in the fact that it re-affirms
the foundation of English case law upon which Wray was built . It is
by no means certain, however, that the decision of the House of
Lords will provide any real guidance to the trial judge in the exercise
of his discretion to exclude evidence in the individual case .
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the opinions of their
Lordships are intended to redirect our energies for controlling police
behaviour away from possible substantive defences and exclusionary
rules of evidence towards alternative solutions .
ALLAN C . HUTCHINSON*
NEIL R. WITHINGTON t
CRIMINAL LAW-NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT-CERTIFICATES OF
ANALYSIS IN PROSECUTIONS .-In prosecutions under the Narcotic
Control Act,' statutory provisions enable the Crown to prove the
nature of the substance in question in a manner that would otherwise
contravene the rule against hearsay evidence . Section 9 of the Act
provides for the introduction into evidence of the certificate of an
analyst stating that he has analyzed or examined the substance and
giving the result of his examination or analysis . This certificate, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, is definitive and unequivocal
proof of the statements contained therein . That is, it is not necessary
for the Crown to call the analyst as a witness in order to prove the
nature of the substance unless the court so orders pursuant to
subsection 2 for the purpose of cross examination .
°2 1bid . Such an approach was recently canvassed by Dubin J.A . in his dissent in
R. v. Rothman (1979), 42 C.C.C . (2d) 377, at p. 385 (Ont . C.A .) .
73 See Weinberg, The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence
(1975), 21 McGill L.J. 1 .
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